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LOOKING TO THE LITIGANT: REACTION ESSAY TO 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Claire B. Wofford* 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court1 
does a lot of things—and does them extremely well.  At the most general level, it 
offers us a collection of new opinions in twenty-five key U.S. Supreme Court cases 
related to gender.  Beginning with one of the earliest instances of the Court’s 
approach to women’s rights (Bradwell v. Illinois2 in 1872) and reaching across 
subsequent decades to the landmark 2015 case on gay marriage (Obergefell v. 
Hodges3), each essay in the volume uses feminist theory and method to reformulate 
Supreme Court opinions and legal doctrine to better reflect feminist conceptions of 
equality and justice. 
In so doing, the collection first reminds us of the extent to which the high 
court’s promulgations have affected central, tangible areas of our lives 
(reproduction, sexuality, employment, family) and affected them in ways often 
unfriendly to certain feminist principles.  The book also underscores the importance 
of the Court’s membership and shows us that who a justice is (or is not) can have an 
enormous impact on the shape and substance of the law.  Traditional judicial 
opinions are often written as if their interpretations and conclusions are the 
inevitable consequence of neutral reasoning and rigorous logic; every essay here 
challenges that presumption and demonstrates just how much opinions are 
influenced by the situated perspectives of the jurist.  Most fundamentally, the 
collection demonstrates that law can be different than it is or was and that feminist 
inquiry can show us how. 
 
 ©  2018 Claire B. Wofford.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and 
distribute copies of this Symposium in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so 
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, 
and includes this provision and copyright notice. 
 * Claire Wofford is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the 
College of Charleston.  B.A., Wellesley College; J.D., Duke University School of Law; Ph.D., 
Emory University. 
 1 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS]. 
 2 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
 3 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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So, what is there to add?  One could quibble mildly with the book’s exclusion 
of important lower court opinions, certain topics, or its confinement of authors to the 
extant legal record.  But every collection of essays requires choices and every set of 
editors wrestles with how best to render their vision.  Indeed, these editors are more 
upfront than many about how and why they made the decisions they did.  Rather 
than critique the book’s coverage or content, I think it is more helpful to model its 
approach to feminist method and theory in examining another potential locus of 
inequality in the law. 
As the editors detail, feminist method comes in a variety of forms—use of 
narrative or asking the “woman question,”4 for instance.  Similarly, feminist theory 
contains a variety of perspectives—from the “same as” claims of formal equality to 
the less relativistic approaches of agency and antisubordination.  What all the 
perspectives have in common, however, is that they shine light where there was none 
before, revealing biased assumptions and adding substantive knowledge that has 
remained covert.  I suggest that even a cursory use of those same tools indicates that, 
aside from the jurist, there is another important player in the legal system whose 
potentially gendered choices are shaping the law: the litigant. 
Feminist Judgments’s focus on jurists alone is not unusual.  My own discipline 
has devoted a great deal of study to understanding why and how the justices of the 
U.S. Supreme Court make the decisions they do.5  Some of the scholarship has even 
examined whether women judges might operate differently than their male 
counterparts, though the findings have been mixed at best.6  The emphasis, 
moreover, is understandable and laudable, as it is jurists who have the final say on 
the content of law.7 
Emphasizing judicial behavior, however, unfortunately overlooks the 
fundamental passivity of the courts.  As much as they might wish to do so, jurists 
cannot reach out into the world of potential legal disputes and select certain topics 
for resolution; they must wait for a litigant to bring the dispute to them.  Indeed, 
were it not for the litigants bringing cases into the legal system in the first place, 
there would be no vehicle through which jurists make the law.  The jurist may be the 
law’s sculptor, but the “raw material” with which he or she works is provided by a 
litigant.  Moreover, if that litigant’s behavior has been shaped by gender, then the 
judicial opinion, whoever has written it, has been as well.  To put it simply, if gender 
is influencing the cases on which jurists work, then gender has influenced the content 
of law—even if the jurist operates with a feminist perspective. 
 
 4 Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990). 
 5 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: 
LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE 
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 6 See Christina L. Boyd, She’ll Settle It?, 1 J.L. & CTS. 193, 201–11 (2013); Christina L. 
Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390–92 
(2010). 
 7 This is most clearly seen in the case of appellate judges, who write opinions based on 
questions of law and thereby generate legal policy. 
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So, what can feminist theory and method tell us about litigants and their 
behavior?  As I have argued elsewhere,8 female litigants might make choices over 
whether and how to use the legal system differently than men.  There is evidence 
from social science and legal scholarship that women are more risk averse than men, 
avoid competition more, and withdraw earlier from competitive environments.9  
When it comes to conflict resolution, women also seem to be more collaborative 
than men, rejecting fighting over “zero sum” winners and losers in favor of 
cooperation, compromise, and solutions that “make everyone happier.”10 
Litigation in the United States, however, is an inherently risky, competitive, 
and adversarial environment.  Female litigants therefore may be more reluctant to 
pursue legal action when they are harmed.  Having filed lawsuits, they may also be 
less combative in the legal process than their male counterparts.  In terms of the 
practicalities of litigation, this translates into women being less likely than men to 
bring cases into court and more likely to resolve the cases they do file through 
mediation or settlement rather than seek a “winner-take-all” final victory from a jury 
or judge. 
I have tested these predictions using survey experiments.11  Imagining 
themselves harmed by a classic “slip and fall” injury and an instance of gender-based 
pay discrimination, survey respondents answered questions about whether and how 
they would pursue legal action.12  The results indicated that women were generally 
less litigation prone than men, though only when the injury was the physical harm; 
 
 8 Claire B. Wofford, Avoiding Adversariness? The Effects of Gender on Litigant Decision-
Making, 13 POL. & GENDER 656, 675–76 (2017) [hereinafter Avoiding Adversariness?]; Claire B. 
Wofford, The Effect of Gender and Relational Distance on Plaintiff Decision Making in the 
Litigation Process, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 966, 969–73 (2017) [hereinafter The Effect of Gender 
and Relational Distance].  
 9 James P. Byrnes et al., Gender Differences in Risk Taking: A Meta-Analysis, 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 367, 369 (1999); Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, Strong Evidence for Gender 
Differences in Risk Taking, 83 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 50, 57 (2012); Charles B. Craver & David 
W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 328–
39 (1999); Seda Ertac & Mehmet Y. Gurdal, Deciding to Decide: Gender, Leadership and Risk-
Taking in Groups, 83 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 24, 26–29 (2012); Christine R. Harris et al., Gender 
Differences in Risk Assessment: Why Do Women Take Fewer Risks than Men?, 1 JUDGMENT & 
DECISION MAKING 48, 51 (2006); Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the 
Litigation Choices of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 67, 88 (1999). 
 10 Avoiding Adversariness?, supra note 8, at 659; see, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A 
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982); Deborah M. 
Kolb & Gloria G. Coolidge, Her Place at the Table: A Consideration of Gender Issues in 
Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 261 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin 
eds., 1991); Mark A. Boyer et al., Gender and Negotiation: Some Experimental Findings from an 
International Negotiation Simulation, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 23, 40 n.19 (2009); Charles B. Craver, 
Gender and Negotiation Performance, 4 SOC. PRAC. 183, 187 (2002); Elizabeth Miklya Legerski 
& Marie Cornwall, Working-Class Job Loss, Gender, and the Negotiation of Household Labor, 24 
GENDER & SOC’Y 447, 465–67 (2010); Morgan, supra note 9, at 70; Laura Sanchez, Gender, Labor 
Allocations, and the Psychology of Entitlement Within the Home, 73 SOC. FORCES 533, 546–48 
(1994). 
 11 Avoiding Adversariness?, supra note 8, at 656–82; The Effect of Gender and Relational 
Distance, supra note 8, at 966–1000.  
 12  Avoiding Adversariness?, supra note 8, at 663. 
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when women suffered from pay discrimination, they were more likely than men to 
file lawsuits, at least in one set of results.13  Across two experiments, women were 
more likely than men to favor mediation instead of filing lawsuits and favored it 
more than men for resolving the dispute once litigation had begun.14  Lastly, both 
men and women were much less willing to bring the pay discrimination case into 
court than they were with the “slip and fall” injury.15 
The implications of these findings for law and the legal system are 
multifaceted.  First, women may not be taking advantage of the potential benefits of 
litigation as much as men.  Whatever gains they could achieve from litigation—
financial compensation, publicity for the wrongdoer, feelings of personal 
empowerment—cannot be realized if they do not file cases or pursue them fully.  In 
addition, as men are more combative during litigation, the legal process itself may 
be slower, costlier, and more adversarial than it need be. 
Perhaps most importantly, the cases that eventually end up in the hands of 
jurists may themselves be gendered.  If lawsuits are filed disproportionally by men, 
and men litigate over different issues, then certain types of cases are more likely to 
become the vehicle for lawmaking.  This does not undercut the bravery and 
commitment of the female litigants highlighted in Feminist Judgments, but it does 
suggest that those plaintiffs and those cases are unusual outliers.16  Both men and 
women, moreover, are less likely to file lawsuits involving one type of sex 
discrimination.  What this means is that even if jurists want to remedy such 
inequalities through the law, they may frequently be denied the opportunity to do so.  
The cases excerpted in Feminist Judgments therefore are quite remarkable, not (just) 
because of their importance for legal doctrine, but simply because they ended up in 
the legal system in the first place. 
As with all empirical work, my studies have major limitations.  At the 
theoretical level, they rest upon ideas about gender that are largely essentialist and 
ignore (for now) how race, class, or sexual identity may also shape litigant behavior.  
Because so few survey respondents, both men and women, ever said they would 
pursue a case all the way to an appeal, the experiments also cannot speak directly to 
the production of appellate court opinions, where most legal policymaking occurs.  
And, of course, there are the myriad ways in which the gender (and race and class, 
etc.) of other legal actors might be impacting the legal system. 
At the same time, however, I would suggest that examining whether gender 
affects litigant decisionmaking is a worthy question and there is some evidence for 
an affirmative, and important, answer.  Again, because it is the litigant’s choices that 
generate the cases on which jurists work, any gendering of those choices necessarily 
means a gendering of the law.  Even if the jurist were to model the opinions in 
Feminist Judgments, that opinion would still be influenced by gender, albeit in a 
very subtle way.  Given that most judges in the United States (and all of those on the 
 
 13 Id. at 675.  
 14 Id. 
 15 Id.  
 16 See the powerful story of Christy Brzonkala, for example.  Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, 
Rewritten Opinion in United States v. Morrison, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 1, at 453–
56. 
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current U.S. Supreme Court) are generally not writing in a feminist way, the law has 
potentially suffered from a “double whammy” of bias in opinion writing and bias in 
the cases themselves.  Such a conclusion is certainly not comforting, but, as with 
Feminist Judgments itself, illustrates the central importance of feminist methods of 
scholarship.  Only through continuing such a pursuit, by pushing our analyses 
onward and outward, will we be able to fully assess the inequities of the legal system 
and the law.
